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Exclusion and Expulsion from Non-Profit
Organizations-The Civil Rights Aspect
Robert S. Pasley*
T o WHAT EXTENT do voluntary non-profit associations have the
right (a) to deny admission to membership, and (b) to ex-
pel existing members? Space does not permit discussion of all
the ramifications of these two questions and some limitation of
scope becomes necessary.' The theme selected has been the
"civil rights" aspect of the problem; more specifically, the right,
in certain areas, to be protected against racial and religious dis-
crimination, and the privilege to exercise the ordinary rights of
citizenship, such as the right of free speech, of petition, of voting,
of resort to the courts, and to employment. 2
In the absence of statute, a truly private, voluntary associa-
tion, not affected with an over-riding "public interest," may limit
its membership on any ground it chooses, provided this is not
merely a sham arrangement to accomplish indirectly what the
law would not permit to be done directly.3
Generally, two problems can be distinguished, one constitu-
tional, the other statutory, although there is some overlap. The
constitutional problem, as traditionally stated, is whether a given
"private" organization is so far affected by, or partakes of, gov-
ernmental activity that "state action" is involved within the
*Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School.
Chafee's classic study, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit,
43 Harv. L. Rev. 993 (1930) dealt with clubs, trade unions, professional as-
sociations, secret societies, churches, and educational institutions. I shall
follow his lead, with emphasis on the first three categories. The mystique of
the secret society seems to be losing its appeal, and few recent cases have
been found dealing with them. Churches present special problems of
religious freedom, best left to separate treatment. And educational insti-
tutions present a whole gamut of problems, ranging from segregation and
"integration" of pupils to academic freedom and tenure of faculty, which
would far transcend the limits of a single article. As to disciplinary pro-
cedures generally, see, Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations & Assns., c. 26 (1956).
2 Very little seems to turn on the question whether the association is in-
corporated. See, Chafee, supra, at 996. Accordingly, what is said herein can
be taken as equally applicable to both incorporated and unincorporated
organizations, except as specifically noted.
3 State of North Dakota v. North Central Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary
Schools, 99 F. 2d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1938); Mayer v. Journeymen Stone-
Cutters' Assn., 47 N. J. Eq. 519, 20 A. 492 (1890); Madden v. Queens
County Jockey Club, Inc., 296 N. Y. 249, 72 N. E. 2d 697 (1947); McKane v.
Adams, 123 N. Y. 609, 25 N. E. 1057 (1890); Cline v. Insurance Exchange of
Texas, 140 Tex. 175, 166 S. W. 2d 677 (1943).
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meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The statutory problem is, given a statute which
prohibits discrimination in admitting persons to public places of
accommodation, whether an allegedly "private" organization is
in fact a subterfuge for evading the statute.
The Constitutional Problem
Since the Civil Rights Cases,4 it has been settled constitu-
tional doctrine that the prohibitions of the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution5 apply
only to "state action" and not to "purely" or "merely" individual
or "private" action.6 The concept of "state action" has, however,
been progressively broadened until it now embraces many types
of activity hitherto considered "private." For example, it has
come to include not only acts of state officers and agents, state
and municipal legislation, acts of the state judiciary, and some
types of state "inaction," but also private actions resulting from
mandatory state legislation, actions of private organizations
which perform quasi-governmental functions, and, in some in-
stances, actions of private organizations which are in receipt of
substantial benefits from the state.7 Another formulation sug-
gests that actions of private groups are subject to constitutional
limitations when (i) the organization is exercising a basic state
function, typically with the affirmative cooperation of the state,
(ii) it invokes affirmative state action by seeking judicial en-
forcement of a private contract, or (iii) it derives its power to
act (usually monopolistic or exclusive) by virtue of statute and
is regulated by governmental authority." Potentially, the most
expansive of these concepts is that which was invoked in the re-
strictive covenant cases,9 that judicial enforcement of private
4 109 U. S. 3 (1883).
5 So far as are here relevant, these are principally the prohibitions against
denying any person the equal protection of the laws, and against denying
the right of a citizen to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude.
6 Civil Rights Cases, supra, n. 4, at 11, 17.
7 Note, State Action-A Study of Requirements Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1 Race Rel. Rep. 613 (1956).
8 St. Antoine, Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look at State Ac-
tion, Equal Protection, and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 Mich. L.
Rev. 993, at 999 (1961).
9 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249
(1953).
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discrimination agreements is "state action" and hence unconsti-
tutional. Probably the broadest extensions of the concept pro-
posed thus far are set forth in Mr. Justice Douglas's concurring
opinion in Garner v. Louisiana, ° that "state action" may be
found in the customs of a society, reinforced by a general pat-
tern of legislation; and in the majority opinion in Lombard v.
Louisiana," finding "state action" in proclamations of the Mayor
of New Orleans and the Superintendent of Police that "sit-in
demonstrations" would not be permitted.
Many commentators have observed that, once this process of
extension got under way, there was no logical stopping point,
short of finding that all private action (not actually prevented
by the state) is "state action," in the sense that it is authorized
or permitted by law; hence the search for "state action" is a
futile exercise which obscures the real issues.'12 The concurring
opinion in Garner v. Louisiana3 has been described as discard-
ing "the substance of the state action limitation while maintain-
ing it as a verbal facade." 14 And again, "the real lesson of Lom-
bard is that the state action concept has become a meaningless
principle in the field of constitutional law-a hollow fiction with-
out substance upon which to rest an opinion." 15
Moreover, warn some of these commentators, 6 blind adher-
ence to the "state action" concept imperils other protected rights,
10 368 U. S. 157, at 176 (1961).
11 373 U. S. 267 (1963).
12 See, e.g., Note, The Disintegration of a Concept-State Action Under the
14th and 15th Amendments, 96 U. Pa. L. Rev. 402 (1948); Horowitz, The
Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
30 S. Calif. L. Rev. 208 (1957); Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action
Concept under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 Cornell L. Q. 375 (1958);
St. Antoine, op. cit. supra, note 9; Van Alstyne and Karst, State Action, 14
Stan. L. Rev. 3 (1961); Karst and Van Alstyne, Comment: Sit-Ins and State
Action-Mr. Justice Douglas Concurring, 14 id. 762 (1962); Williams, The
Twilight of State Action, 41 Tex. L. Rev. 347 (1963); Comment, A State-
ment Against State Action, 37 S. Calif. L. Rev. 463 (1964). But see Mc-
Kenney, An Argument in Favor of Strict Adherence to the State Action
Requirement, 5 Wm. & M. L. Rev. 213 (1964).
13 Supra, n. 10.
14 Karst and Van Alstyne, op. cit. supra, note 12, at 763.
15 Comment, A Statement Against State Action, 37 S. Calif. L. Rev. 463, at
467 (1964).
16 E.g., Williams, op. cit. supra, note 12; Karst and Van Alstyne, op. cit.
supra, note 12.
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notably freedom of association, 7 and the privilege of individual
persons or private groups to discriminate (within limits) in their
social and business relations.'
Various alternatives have been proposed, all resembling each
other to the extent that they suggest balancing tests, based on
the degree of state involvement (if any), the actual impact and
seriousness of the alleged discrimination, and the practical con-
sequences of granting or withholding relief. As suggested by
Professor Williams, the real problem is "to determine the extent
to which the private group has moved toward a relationship with
the public which gives the public the obligation to police on a
constitutional basis the group's desire to discriminate." 19
Despite the force of the critics' objections, the Supreme
Court has continued to adhere to the "state action" requirement,
attenuated as it has become.
State Action
(a) Leased Premises-One of the most common situations
in which the question of unconstitutional discrimination by a
private organization has been at issue arises where the organi-
zation occupies premises leased from a governmental body. Here
the allegation is that the lease is a form of governmental aid,
which converts the ostensibly private acts of the organization
into a form of "state action." While the results of the cases have
not been uniform, some lines of demarcation can be staked out.
The problem can be avoided altogether by holding that a
lease of public property to a private club, to which the public
generally is not admitted is beyond the powers of the municipal-
ity or state agency.20
17 Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. N. A. A. C. P., 366 U. S. 293 (1961);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1959). Cf., Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U. S. 820
(1961). And see Rice, Freedom of Association (1962); Emerson, Freedom
of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 Yale L. J. 1 (1964); Solter,
Freedom of Association-A New and Fundamental Civil Right, 27 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 653 (1959).
18 Williams, op. cit. supra, note 12, at 390.
19 Id. at 378.
20 Lincoln Park Traps v. Chicago Park Dist., 323 Ill. App. 107, 55 N. E. 2d
173 (1944). Grant of special privileges to members of ostensibly private
shooting club. See also: Easterly v. Dempster, 112 F. Supp. 214 (E. D. Tenn.
1953). Lease of golf course for financial reasons. Dicta, decided on pro-
cedural grounds; Kern v. City Com'rs of City of Newton, 121 Kan. 565, 100
P. 2d 709 (1940).
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The opposite approach is to hold that the lessee is a mere
"lagent" or "instrumentality" of the municipality or state body
and therefore can discriminate no more than could the latter act-
ing directly.21 More recent cases have onitted any reference to
the "agency" or "instrumentality" theory, and have simply held
that where a municipality or state body owns a public park, or
other facility for amusement or recreation, it may not avoid its
obligation not to discriminate simply by leasing the facility to a
private operator.
22
In two cases involving fairly short-term leases to theatrical
groups, it was held that there was no violation of the fourteenth
amendment, primarily on the ground that, since the property was
for the time surplus to the needs of the city, it could be leased
to a private person to use as he saw fit,23 and that, since the city
did not participate in the operations of the lessee and was willing
to lease the facilities at other times to Negro organizations on a
non-discriminatory basis, there was no violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 24
On the other hand, in Derrington v. Plummer,25 the court
enjoined renewal of a lease by the county of a courthouse cafe-
teria to a tenant who allegedly intended to continue his practice
of excluding Negroes. The county itself was not a party to the
discrimination, and did not control the lessee, but the fact that
it owned the building, that it was a public building, and that the
cafeteria was intended to be patronized by persons having occa-
sion to be in the courthouse, were held to be enough to meet the
requirements of "state action." 26 The same reasoning was used
21 Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S. D., W. Va. 1948); Culver v.
City of Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 83 N. E. 2d 82 (1948). (Both cases in-
volved municipal swimming pools.)
22 City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F. 2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957) (Golf
course built by city with aid of WPA funds, partially on land owned by
City Board of Education); Department of Conservation v. Tate, 231 F. 2d
615 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 838 (1956) (State Park).
23 Harris v. City of St. Louis, 233 Mo. App. 911, 111 S. W. 2d 995 (1938).
To the extent that the opinion of the trial court, adopted by the appellate
court, approves the "general state custom of segregation," it must today be
regarded as suspect.
24 Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Association, 202 F. 2d 275 (6th Cir.
1953), affg. 102 F. Supp. 525 (W. D., Ky. 1951), vacated and remanded, 347
U. S. 971 (1954), for consideration in the light of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 347 U. S. 483 (1954). No further proceedings are reported.
25 240 F. 2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U. S. 924 (1957).
26 By way of dictum, the court said that it would not be unconstitutional
for a purely private lessee of surplus public property to discriminate, when
the municipality had no such purpose, did not join in the enterprise, and
did not reserve control. Id. at 925.
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under similar facts in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author-
ity,27 finding a restaurant "an integral part of a public building
devoted to a public parking service."
Reviewing the lease and concession cases, it seems signifi-
cant that "state action" has been found (albeit not without occa-
sional straining2 ) in all but a very few, and those of somewhat
uncertain standing today. It would not be safe to conclude, how-
ever, that any lease by a public authority would now be held to
constitute "state action." No case has squarely repudiated the
idea that a lease of property, surplus for the time to the public's
needs, made at arm's length for an adequate consideration to a
private organization, where the lessor has no purpose of dis-
crimination and reserves no substantial control over the lessee,
is not "state action." The difficulty is that all these conditions
are rarely met. Even if they are, no one can be sure, on the
basis of existing precedents, just what the criteria for this ex-
ception really are.
29
If the search for "state action" per se is abandoned, and a
balancing test applied, it seems clear that the "agency" cases
would be decided the same way, as would the cases of subter-
fuge, as well as the cases involving the leasing of public parks,
swimming pools, golf courses, and other places of amusement,
which by their nature are intended to be for the benefit of the
public at large.30 The "short-term" leases involved in the Har-
ris3' and Muir "3 2 cases are not so easy of solution. Here, sup-
porters of a balancing theory would reject the "surplus prop-
erty" test and ask, rather, whether the operations of the lessee,
27 365 U. S. 715 (1961), rev'g. 157 A. 2d 894 (Del. 1960). A restaurant lo-
cated in a building leased from a State parking authority and financed by
public funds. State action was found in the public ownership and financing
of the building, the responsibility of the parking authority to maintain the
building, and certain tax exemptions afforded the lessee, but primarily in
the reciprocal, physical and financial relationship between the restaurant
and the rest of the parking facility. See 59 Mich. L. Rev. 452 (1961); Lewis,
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority-A Case Without Precedent, 61
Col. L. Rev. 1458 (1961).
28 In his disssent in the Burton case, Mr. Justice Harlan said that the ma-
jority had found "state action" by "undiscriminatingly throwing together
various factual bits and pieces and then undermining the resulting struc-
ture by an equally vague disclaimer." 365 U. S. 715, at 728 (1961).
29 See Lewis, op. cit. supra, note 27.
30 See, e.g., Williams, op. cit. supra, note 12, at 384; Van Alstyne and Karst,
op. cit. supra, note 12 at 55.
31 Supra, note 23.
32 Supra, note 24.
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and their impact on the public, were matters of such "high public
interest," 33 under all the circumstances, that discriminatory ac-
tion should be deemed such action of the state as to demand con-
stitutional protection. 34 The nature and duration of the lease
would of course be relevant, but even more relevant would be
the nature of the activity carried on in the leased premises, the
general public demand for the entertainment or other facilities
offered therein, and the availability of other facilities.
35
(b) Economic Aid-Where a state or municipality renders
substantial economic assistance to an organization, by way of
subsidy, tax concessions, use of the power of eminent domain,
or the like (or any combination of these), the case for "state
action" would appear to be much stronger. Paradoxically, the
opinion in the leading case, Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town,3 6 which
involved a housing project financed by a private insurance com-
pany with substantial state aid, found no "state action," on the
grounds that the state had not "consciously exerted its power in
aid of discrimination," and the private organization had not "act-
ed in a governmental capacity so recognized by the state." 37
Similarly, where the only governmental assistance involved was
FHA and VA financing on the houses sold, the court held that
this was not enough to constitute "state action." 38
In Eaton v. Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial
Hospital,39 a private hospital, which received some grants-in-aid
from the city and had contracted with the coufity to pay for the
care of indigent patients, granted "courtesy staff" privileges to
doctors on a race-discriminatory basis. It was held that "state
33 St. Antoine, op. cit. supra, note 8, at 1011.
34 Cf. Williams, op. cit. supra, note 12, at 378.
35 It should be noted that very few of the lease or concession cases involve
genuine private clubs or non-profit associations. The one which most clearly
did so, Lincoln Park Traps v. Chicago Park Dist., supra, n. 20, was not de-
cided on federal constitutional grounds. The municipal golf and swimming
clubs were not truly "private" in any fair meaning of that term. The cafe-
teria and restaurant cases involved business enterprises. The private opera
and theater company cases are closer to our problem, but are still some-
what distinguishable. The leasing test, then, whatever its other deficiencies,
has had little impact in this precise area, although the principles involved
would of course be relevant to any case which might arise.
36 299 N. Y. 512, 87 N. E. 2d 541 (1949) (4-3 decision), cert. denied, 339
U. S. 981 (1950).
37 Id. at 535, 87 N. E. 2d 541, at 551.
38 Johnson v. Levitt and Son, 131 F. Supp. 114 (E. D. Pa. 1955).
39 261 F. 2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U. S. 984 (1959).
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action" was not involved and that the alleged discrimination was
therefore not unconstitutional.
Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore4" involved a
private art school which received a subsidy from the state and
city amounting to 23 per cent of its income. State and city offi-
cials were permitted to appoint students for free tuition scholar-
ships, but in all other respects management of the school was
free of public control. It was held that "state action" was not
involved and that the school was free to discriminate.
But where a library,41 which had started out as a private
charitable foundation, was receiving a subsidy from the city
amounting to virtually all its annual income, title to its real and
personal property had vested in the city, the city audited its
accounts, and the city had established rules for appointment of
its trustees, it was held that "state action" was involved and
that the library could not constitutionally deny admission, on
the ground of race, to a Negro applicant for a library training
course.
If a principle is to be gleaned from this line of cases, it
seems to be that state economic aid standing alone (unless it is
very substantial) is not enough to constitute "state action," but
where it is coupled with state control of policy or management,
or accompanied by a conscious intention on the part of the state
authorities to discriminate, "state action" will be found. It is
doubtful, however, whether this principle will long remain un-
challenged, in view of current theories as to what constitutes
"state action." 42
40 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md., 1948).
41 Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F. 2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. de-
nied, 326 U. S. 721 (1945).
42 The Stuyvesant Town case, supra, n. 36, was a 4-3 decision, and it has
been severely criticized. See e.g. Williams, op. cit. supra, n. 12, at 377. It is
questionable whether the James Walker Memorial Hospital case, supra, n.
39, would today be able to escape a finding of state action. (See Williams,
at 381.) Doubts might even be expressed concerning the Baltimore art
school. VA and FHA financing are still probably not enough the justify a
finding of "state action." Discrimination in the sale by the original entre-
preneur of housing for which the government guarantees mortgage loans is
now forbidden by Exec. Order No. 11063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (1962). Am-
bitious urban redevelopment plans may well prove to be another story.
See Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 1 (M. D. Tenn.
1963). Cf. dissenting opinion of Rives, J., in Barnes v. City of Gadsden,
268 F. 2d 593, at 594 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U. S. 915 (1960). And
see Ming v. Horgan, 3 Race Rel. Rep. 693 (Super. Ct., Sacramento Co.
Calif. 1958).
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Under a "balancing" test, the results would be less clear,
but perhaps easier to rationalize. For example, the Stuyvesant
Town case might well be decided the other way, on the ground
that the "intimate relationship between the city and slum clear-
ance, the size of the housing project, and the fact that the city
had to exercise its powers of condemnation to obtain the prop-
erty for the corporation show the quasi-public nature of the
corporation." 43
(c) State licensing.-The argument has been advanced that
licensing of an enterprise by a State or municipality is enough
to constitute "state action." The most extreme statement of this
position is found in the concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Doug-
las in Garner v. Louisiana44 and in Lombard v. State of Lou-
isiana.45 In the former case he said:
But one who operates an enterprise under a license from
the government enjoys a privilege that derives from the
people. . . The necessity of a license shows that the public
has rights in respect to those premises.
41
And in the latter:
This restaurant needs a permit from Louisiana to oper-
ate and during the existence of the license the State has
broad powers of visitation and control. This restaurant is
thus an instrumentality of the State since the State charges
it with duties to the public and supervises its performance.
47
But as critics have observed, 48 this argument breaks down
when the purpose of the licensing requirements in these cases is
43 Williams, op. cit. supra, n. 12, at 378-79. The James Walker Hospital case,
supra, n. 39, would involve "evaluating whether the private group has so
moved into the area of public concern that the public's interest in elimi-
nating the particular discrimination in question must outweigh the per-
sonal right to discriminate." See Williams, op. cit. supra, n. 12, at 382. The
same could well be said of the original financing of a new housing develop-
ment with the aid of federal mortgage guarantees. On the other hand,
subsequent private sales of individual lots in the same development would
appear to be much less a matter of "high public concern." This is the line
drawn by Exec. Order No. 11063, supra, n. 42, although not expressly on
constitutional grounds.
44 368 U. S. 157, at 177 (1961).
45 373 U. S. 267, at 274 (1963).
46 368 U. S. at 184-185 (1961).
47 373 U. S. at 282 (1963).
48 Comment, A Statement Against State Action, 37 S. Calif. L. Rev. 463, at
469 (1964); Karst and Van Alstyne, Comment: Sit-Ins and State Action-
Mr. Justice Douglas Concurring, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 762, at 773-776 (1962).
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considered. They were merely health regulations, which had
nothing to do with who should be served, but only what should
be served. The state could not demand either a policy of segre-
gation or of integration as a prerequisite to issuing the license.
In other words, while the licensing was "state action," without
question, still it had nothing to do with the alleged discrimina-
tion. Mr. Justice Douglas's views have not been accepted by a
majority of his colleagues, 49 and they do not represent the gen-
eral view of the courts, which have in the main rejected the
licensing argument.50
Of course where the State health regulations require segre-
gated facilities, the matter is entirely different.51 But this is not
so much a matter of licensing as of affirmative regulation. Sim-
ilarly, where the "licensing" amounts to an exclusive franchise,
in effect giving the licensee a monopoly, "state action" is suffi-
ciently involved so that racial segregation is regarded as violat-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment.52
The most common application of the licensing situation to a
truly private club would be a requirement that a license be ob-
tained for the sale of liquor on the premises. Here, unless the
licensing statute, as worded or as enforced by state officials, it-
self imposes a segregation requirement, it would seem clear that
no "state action" is involved in the constitutional sense. Where,
however, the nature of the establishment approaches a place of
"public accommodation," the constitutional problem, whether
licensing is required or not, becomes more formidable and ap-
proaches the insoluble. Fortunately, this matter is now largely
covered by recent civil rights legislation, and to this we now
turn.
Civil Rights Legislation
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits, inter alia,
racial or religious discrimination or segregation in any places of
49 See Monaghan, Law and the Negro Revolution, 44 Boston U. L. Rev. 467,
at 483 (1964).
50 Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F. 2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959);
Slack v. Atlantic White Tower System, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 124 at 129 (D. Md.
1960); Tamelleo v. New Hampshire Jockey Club, Inc., 102 N. H. 547, 110 A.
2d 10 (1960); Cf. Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, Inc., 296 N. Y.
249, 72 N. E. 2d 697 (1947).
51 Robinson v. Florida, 378 U. S. 1 (1964).
52 Boman v. Birmingham Transit Company, 280 F. 2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960).
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public accommodation 53 (principally hotels, restaurants, gasoline
stations, and places of amusement), if their operations affect
interstate commerce or if discrimination or segregation is sup-
ported by state action. We are concerned here principally with
the exclusionary language of Section 201 (e):
The provisions of this title shall not apply to a private
club or other establishment not in fact open to the public,
except to the extent that the facilities of such establishment
are made available to the customers or patrons of an estab-
lishment within the scope of subsection (b).
The intent of the latter exception apparently is to foreclose such
devices as operating a "private" night club or bar for the benefit
of the patrons of a motel, for example, on a discriminatory basis.
Senator Humphrey explained the purpose of the subsection (e)
as follows:
The test as to whether a private club is really a private
club, or whether it is an establishment, really not open to
the public, is a factual one...
It is not our intention to permit this section to be used
to evade the prohibitions of the title by the creation of sham
establishments which are in fact open to the white public
and not to Negroes. We intend only to protect the genuine
privacy of private clubs or other establishments whose mem-
bership is genuinely selective on some reasonable basis.
54
While no decisions known to the author have yet been ren-
dered under Section 201 (e) of the Act, a large number of states
now have statutes prohibiting discrimination in places of public
accommodation, 55 many of which contain similar exclusionary
language, 56 and there have been some state court rulings on
what it means.
A leading case is Matter of Castle Hill Beach Club, Inc. v.
Arbury.57 Petitioner was a membership corporation which oper-
53 P. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243. The term "place of public accommodation" is
defined in detail in Section 201(b) of the Act.
54 110 Cong. Rec. 13219 (daily ed. June 13, 1964).
55 As of May 31, 1964, there were some 35 states having such statutes.
56 For example, § 40 of the New York Civil Rights Law (McKinney, 1948)
excludes "any institution, club, or place of accommodation which is in its
nature distinctly private." See also N. Y. Executive Law § 292, subd. 9
(McKinney, 1964 Supp.). Cf. 18 N. J. Stat. Ann. § 25-5, subd. 1 (Supp. 1963)
("institution, bona fide club, or place of accommodations, which is in its
nature distinctly private"); 18 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 4654(d) (Purdon, 1963) (sim-
ilar language).
57 2 N. Y. 2d 596, 142 N. E. 2d 186 (1957).
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ated a 16-acre bathing and recreation park in the Bronx. In
finding that the petitioner was operating a "place of public ac-
commodation," and was not a private club, the New York State
Commission Against Discrimination and the Courts found, inter
alia, (i) that from 1928 to 1950 the facilities had been operated
on a commercial basis as a place of public accommodation; (ii)
that formation of the membership corporation in 1950 did not
change the essential nature of the operation, the facilities and
management, or the rates; (iii) that after 1950 those who had
been season members were automatically admitted to the newly
formed membership corporation; (iv) that applications for mem-
bership were accepted without interview, investigation, or spon-
sorship, on the pro forma recommendation of a number of the
governing committee; (v) that the "members" had no say in the
management, affairs, or policies of the corporation; (vi) that
petitioner was listed in the classified telephone directory as a
public bathing beach; and (vii) that petitioner was licensed as
a public bathing establishment, held a commercial beer license
(rather than a club liquor license), and paid a New York City
gross business tax. These facts led to the conclusion that "the
membership corporation was a mere sham designed to conceal
the truly public nature of the enterprise." 18
In Everett v. Harron,59 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
struck down a "crude attempt" to give a commercial swimming
pool and recreational facility "the character of a private club in
order to justify a selective admission of applicants" as a "device
to keep Negroes from the swimming pools." 60 The court was not
swayed by the fact that the statute defining "place of public ac-
commodation, resort or amusement" 01 enumerated some forty
odd places, but did not specifically name "swimming pools."
The same result has been reached in Ohio.6 2 Although the
58 Id. at 608, 142 N. E. 2d at 186, at 191. Camp-of-the-Pines, Inc. v. New
York Times Co., 184 Misc. 389, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 475 (Sup. Co., Albany Co.
1945), involved a similar attempt by a summer camp, which publicly so-
licited paying customers, to limit the use of its facilities to dues-paying
members of a so-called "Camp-of-the-Pines Vacation Club." Held: a place
of public accommodation and membership requirement a "sham, insincere,
and mere pretense." (53 N. Y. S. 2d at 484.)
59 380 Pa. 123, 110 A. 2d 383 (1955).
60 Id. at 125, 110 A. 2d 383, 385.
61 18 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 4654(c) (Purdon, 1963).
62 Gillespie v. Lake Shore Golf Club, 56 Ohio L. Abs. 222, 91 N. E. 2d 290
(1950).
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Ohio statute63 apparently contains no specific exclusion for pri-
vate clubs, the court in the case cited assumed that such an ex-
emption existed, but held that it had no application to an alleged
private club operated by a lessee, which was in fact a "subter-
fuge" through which the owner "attempted to avoid the legal
consequences of discrimination in operating a place of public
amusement." 64
It has been held that the prohibitions of these statutes cannot
be avoided by such devices as, for example, setting aside certain
banquet or meeting rooms in a public restaurant and claiming
that they are "private facilities," 65 or "contracting" with a pri-
vate club or lodge for the operation of a public park on a par-
ticular day, ostensibly for the benefit of members of the lodge,
but in fact for everyone but members of the N.A.A.C.P. or of a
City Council on Human Rights. 66
This is not to suggest that the defense of a private club will
never be sustained. In Garfield v. Sands Beach Club, Inc.,6 7 the
court had merely to point out that the plaintiffs themselves had
joined the club and had been accepted as members!
Not so easy of disposition was the case of Delaney v. Central
Valley Golf Club.68 Plaintiffs, who were Negroes, were denied
the privilege of playing on a golf course maintained by defend-
ant, which was a duly organized membership corporation man-
aged by a Board of Governors. Although there were highway
signs advertising the course as "public," there was no evidence
that defendant had erected them. Defendant's by-laws limited
the privileges of the course to members and their guests, al-
though admittedly there had been occasional "relaxation of the
63 Ohio Rev. Code, § 2901.35 (Page, 1954).
64 Supra, n. 62, at 223, 91 N. E. 2d 290, 291.
65 Evans v. Ross, 57 N. J. Super., 223, 154 A. 2d 441 (App. Div. 1959), pet.
for certification denied, 31 N. J. 292, 157 A. 2d 362 (1959).
66 Fletcher v. Coney Island, Inc., 121 N. E. 2d 574 (Court of Common Pleas,
Hamilton Co., Ohio, 1954), rev'd. on other grounds, 100 Ohio App. 259, 136
N. E. 2d 344 (1955); judgment of reversal aff'd., 165 Ohio St. 150, 134 N. E. 2d
344 (1956) (5-2 decision).
67 137 N. Y. S. 2d 58 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1954). The grievance was al-
legedly wrongful "ejection," but there was no allegation of discriminatory
denial of privileges. Held: not properly brought under N. Y. Civil Rights
Law.
68 28 N. Y. S. 2d 932 (Sup. Co., N. Y. Co. 1941), aff'd. 263 App. Div. 710, 31
N. Y. S. 2d 834 (1st Supp. 1941), affd., 289 N Y. 577, 43 N. E. 2d 716 (1942)
(5-2 decision).
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enforcement of the rules." 89 The trial court concluded, on all
the evidence, that the club was private and was not a place of
"public accommodations, resort or amusement." Significantly,
the court said that even if it were public, the detailed enumera-
tion in the statute of many types of public places, omitting golf
courses, indicated a legislative intent not to cover the latter.
70
These cases demonstrate that, while the courts will not be
deceived by a sham club concealing what is really a place of
public accommodation, there are many close factual situations
which are not capable of precise delineation. Since possible com-
binations of facts are infinite, no "rule" other than one of sound
judgment and common sense can be laid down. One interesting
and recurrent pattern, however, is that of the so-called "bottle
club," which holds a state or local liquor license and purports to
sell to "members only."
In 1957, the Attorney General of Michigan rendered an
opinion7 1 that a "semi-public" golf club, which held a Class C
license, authorizing it to sell liquor at retail for consumption on
the premises, was prima facie subject to the Michigan civil rights
statutes and could not deny golf privileges to Negro applicants.
While other factors might also be relevant, the fact that the
"club" held a type of liquor license intended for those selling
at retail, rather than a club license, would be proper evidence
that it was not operating on a bona fide basis as a private club.
A recent law review note on this subject suggests that "the
best test for distinguishing the bona fide private club from a
sham is the presence or absence of a profit motive." 72 This
makes a good deal of sense and, moreover, provides a test which
is not limited to the liquor license cases. Although it may not
solve all the problems in this area, it would at least serve as a
convenient starting point.
89 28 N. Y. S. 2d 932, at 934.
70 On this point, the court's rationale is flatly contra to that of the Pennsyl-
vania court in Everett v. Horton, supra, n. 59. The New York legislature
promptly amended the statute to include public golf courses. The Court of
Appeals affirmed per curiam, solely on the ground that a question of fact
had been presented "in regard to the reason for exclusion," and there was
a short and pungent dissent by Judge Finch, in which Judge Desmond con-
curred. 289 N. Y. 277, at 278, 43 N. E. 2d 716, at 717.
71 Op. No. 3041, 1 Rep. Att'y Gen. Mich. 387 (1957); 2 Race Rel. Rep. 1046
(1957).
72 Comment, Liquor Regulation, Racial Discrimination, and Private Clubs
in Kansas, 13 Kansas L. Rev. 135, at 143-44 (1964).
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Other Considerations
We turn now to some of the special problems presented by
particular types of organizations. Here we shall find that, in ad-
dition to the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Stat-
utes, other laws, regulations, legal principles, and policies often
play a decisive role.
Private Schools
Brown v. Board of Education73 is of course the leading case
outlawing racial segregation in the public schools. Although
Brown and its companion cases involved elementary and high
schools, prior 74 and subsequent 75 rulings of the Supreme Court
have made it clear that the same principle also applies to public
institutions of higher learning. It is clear that the device of an
ostensible private school, which is in fact supported by public
funds, cannot be used by state or local authorities as a subter-
fuge to evade the requirements of the Brown case. 76
But what of the bona fide private school? Clearly, it has a
constitutional right to exist 77 and, subject to state supervision of
its educational standards, to determine its own policies on ad-
mission, curriculum, and so on. But whether this includes the
power to deny admission on racial or religious grounds has thus
far, in the absence of statute, arisen in only a few cases, and in
these the decisions have turned on the presence or absence of
'state action." 78
73 347 U. S. 483 (1954).
74 See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, 339 U. S. 637 (1950).
75 See, e.g., Lucy v. Adams, 350 U. S. 1 (1955); Meredith v. Fair, 305 F. 2d
343 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U. S. 828 (1962).
76 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958), at 17, the "constitutional rights
of children not to be discriminated against in school admissions on grounds
of race or color . . . can neither be nullified openly and directly by state
legislation or state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly
by them through evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted 'in-
geniously or ingenuously' "; Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Ed-
ward County, 377 U. S. 218 (1964). Held: the action of the County School
Board in closing the public schools, meanwhile contributing to the support
of private segregated white schools which took their place, denied Negro
school children the equal protection of the laws.
77 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925).
78 The questions are distinct. Many private schools are denominational and
exist primarily to furnish education in the context of a particular religion.
(Continued on next page)
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1965
14 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
In the Girard College Case,7 9 this question received a some-
what mechanistic answer. Stephen Girard died in 1831 leaving
the bulk of his fortune to the City of Philadelphia for the estab-
lishment of a "college" SO for "poor white male orphans." The
City of Philadelphia created a special Board of Trustees to ad-
minister the estate, and later the Legislature created a Board of
Directors of City Trusts, to which administration of the trust
was transferred.81 In 1954, six Negro orphan boys were denied
admission by the Board. A petition to the Orphans' Court for
an order to show cause why they should not be admitted was
denied, and this decision was affirmed, citing the clear provisions
of the Girard Will. The courts further held that state action was
not involved, such as would make enforcement of the terms of
the trust violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 The United
States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, saying in a short
per curiam opinion8 3 that, since the Board which operated Girard
College was a state agency, its action, even as trustee, was "dis-
crimination by the state," forbidden by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Orphans' Court thereupon removed the Board as
Trustee and substituted thirteen private citizens, taking no fur-
ther action toward ordering admission of petitioners. The Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, 4 and the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari.8 5
Somehow, the result seems less than satisfactory. Girard
College remained essentially the same before and after the
(Continued from preceding page)
To deny such schools the power to confine admission to those of their own
religion might well be an invasion of religious liberty. It is interesting,
however, that many denominational schools do admit students of other re-
ligions, usually excusing them from the religious observances normally
required.
79 See Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548, at 562, 127 A. 2d 287, at 293 (1956).
For the factual background and general sociological significance of the case,
see Gordon, The Girard College Case: Desegregation and a Municipal Trust,
304 Annals 53 (March 1956).
80 It was not really a "college" in the current sense of the word, but an
orphans' institution, the chief function of which was to provide a home, in-
cluding room, board, and incidentally, instruction.
81 This Board included the Mayor, President of City Council, and 12 other
citizens appointed by the Board of Judges of the Court of Common Pleas.
82 386 Pa. 548, 127 A. 287 (1956).
83 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of the City of Phila-
delphia, 353 U. S. 230 (1957).
84 Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A. 2d 844 (1958).
85 357 U. S. 570 (1958), rehearing denied, 358 U. S. 858 (1958).
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change of trustees, as did the unfortunate applicants. That the
decision rested solely on the presence or absence of state officials
on the Board of Trustees would seem to demonstrate the highly
artificial nature of the "state action" test. One can agree with
the majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that Girard's
"primary object" was to establish and maintain Girard College,
and that administration of the trust by the City was a mere
means, which could and should be changed if necessary to
carry out Girard's primary objective. But this leaves un-
answered the argument advanced by Judge Musmanno in his
dissenting opinions"0 that Girard College, in the light of its whole
history and operation, and regardless of the nature of its trustees,
was in fact a "public institution," as much as the University of
Pennsylvania, and therefore bound by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
The final outcome has been criticized, even under the state
action theory.87 Applying his balancing theory, Professor Wil-
liams sees "state action" in both cases, but concludes that the
result in the second decision is "clearly acceptable on the basis
of a balancing of an individual's right to designate how his
property will be used as against the public concern with dis-
crimination." 88 One might agree with this approach and yet
question the result in the case of Girard College.8 9
A possible solution to the type of problem posed by the
Girard case is to apply the doctrine of cy pres, or the related
doctrine of deviation, to strike the discriminatory language from
the terms of the gift, leaving the balance of the trust intact. The
Pennsylvania Court felt powerless to do this, in view of the ex-
press language of the will. So did the Supreme Court of Mich-
igan in a somewhat comparable case.90 On the other hand, the
courts of New Jersey, New York, and England have invoked
86 386 Pa. 548, at 615, 127 A. 2d 287, 318 (1956); 391 Pa. 434, at 457, 138 A. 2d
844, 854 (1958).
87 See, e.g., 47 Geo. L. J. 391 (1958); 33 N. D. Law. 495 (1958).
88 Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 Tex. L. Rev. 347, at 376 (1963).
89 See Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of
Stephen Girard, 66 Yale L. J. 979 (1957). Cf., Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer:
Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473, at 500.
90 LaFond v. City of Detroit, 357 Mich. 362, 98 N. W. 2d 530 (1959) (4-4
decision), noted 45 Iowa L. Rev. 954 (1960). Cf. Moore v. City and County
of Denver, 133 Colo. 190, 292 P. 2d 986 (1956).
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cy pres to delete racial restrictions with which the donee or ad-
ministrator of a trust fund was unwilling to comply.9 1
A case which presented even more squarely the issue of dis-
crimination by a private university was Guillory v. Administra-
tors of Tulane University of Louisiana.92 Here, different Judges
reached startlingly different conclusions from the same basic
facts. Without any criticism intended, it is quite apparent that
widely varying attitudes toward the role of the courts and of
the Constitution in this area have shaped these different con-
clusions. In the first round, Judge Wright held that Tulane
could not discriminate in its admissions policy on racial grounds,
first, because it was and always had been a public institution,
but even if it were not, the involvement of the state was suf-
ficient to constitute "state action." 93 In support of his conclu-
sions, Judge Wright reviewed the history of Tulane (which had
admittedly started as a state university), cited its immunity
from taxes, its revenues from state lands, the control by the legis-
lature of its scholarship policies, and the presence on its govern-
ing board of three public officials. By way of dictum, Judge
Wright questioned whether any school or college could be so
"private" as to escape the reach of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 9
4
On rehearing, Judge Ellis vacated Judge Wright's summary
judgment and set the case down for trial, indicating that he
would demand a showing of "substantial" or "significant" state
action before granting the relief prayed for.95 Seven months
later, he rendered his decision denying plaintiffs relief.9 6 Re-
viewing the evidence, Judge Ellis found it "overwhelming" that
the "Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund" (a cor-
poration organized in 1882 to accept gifts, on which the donors
had placed racial restrictions) was a "private corporation, pri-
91 Howard Savings Inst. of Newark v. Peep, 34 N. J. 494, 170 A. 2d 39 (1961);
Matter of Hawley, 32 Misc. 2d 624, 223 N. Y. S. 2d 803 (Surr. Ct., N. Y. Co.
1961); In re Dominion Students' Hall Trust [1947] 1 Ch. 183 (Ch. Div.
1946); Cf. Matter of Hastings, 17 Misc. 2d 368, 186 N. Y. S. 2d 324 (Surr. Ct.,
N. Y. Co. 1959).
92 203 F. Supp. 855 (E. D. La. 1962) (motion for summary judgment
granted), 207 id. 554 (1962) (summary judgment vacated), 212 id. 674 (in-
junction denied), aff'd. 306 F. 2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962).
93 203 F. Supp. 855 (E. D. La. 1962).
94 Id. at 858-59.
95 207 F. Supp. 554 (E. D. La. 1962), aff'd. 306 F. 2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962).
96 212 F. Supp. 674 (E. D. La. 1962).
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vately endowed, and engaged in the activity of academic instruc-
tion and pursuit." 97 Any state participation he found to be
de minimis9s
The opposing positions taken by Judge Wright and Judge
Ellis on the same facts cannot be reconciled. Judge Wright is
prepared, if necessary, to find all education, public or private,
so affected with a public interest as to be subject to the restric-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment, whereas Judge Ellis is un-
willing to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to private schools,
except as he may be compelled to do so by square holdings of
the Supreme Court. Obviously, what is at stake here is more
than a different view of the law or even of the Constitution.
Rather it is a different philosophy of education, of society, of the
rights of donors, and of the rights of individuals. These conflicts
run far too deep to be resolved by rules about "state action,"
or even by formulae for the "balancing" of interests.
In a perceptive article,99 one of the very few devoted to the
problem, 10 0 Professor Arthur S. Miller concludes, inter alia, that
the question whether private schools may discriminate is only
one facet of the overall question of Negro-white relations in this
country, that the legal problems can be understood only as part
of this context, that voluntary racial integration by private
schools (already widespread, especially on the part of denomi-
national schools) is probably the key to future developments
both in the private and public school areas, but that meanwhile
the judicial decisions have been "edging" toward an outlawing
of racial clauses in private agreements, as a matter of public
policy.10 1 Eight years later, I cannot find much to add to Pro-
fessor Miller's cautious observations.
By way of a footnote, mention should be made of a recent
California case, Reed v. Hollywood Professional School.102 The
court refused to construe the California civil rights statute 0 3
as being applicable to private schools, and held that a Negro
97 Id. at 677.
98 Id. at 681.
99 Miller, Racial Discrimination and Private Schools, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 145,
245 (1957).
100 But see Van Alstyne and Karst, State Action, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 3, at 28-
36 (1961); Briggs (ed.), Private Schools Must Integrate? 16 S. W. L. J. 284(1962).
101 Miller, op. cit. supra, note 99, at 281-86.
102 169 C. A. 2d 887, 338 P. 2d 633 (App. Dept., Super. Ct., Los Angeles Co.
1959).
103 Calif. Civil Code, §§ 51-52 (Deering, 1960).
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child who had been denied admission to such a school10 4 had no
constitutional grievance.
In a few states, the civil rights statutes do extend to private
educational institutions. Thus, Section 40 of the New York
Civil Rights Law' 0 5 covers "kindergartens, primary and secon-
dary schools, high schools, academies, colleges and universities,
extension course, and all educational institutions under the super-
vision of the regents of the state of New York," as well as all
such institutions which are "supported in whole or in part by
public funds or by contributions solicited from the general pub-
lic." Section 296-4 of the New York Executive Law1"0 bars non-
sectarian, tax exempt educational institutions from discrimi-
nating on grounds of race, color or religion. Similar statutes
exist in Massachusetts and New Jersey. 10 7
Fraternities and Sororities
Is there a constitutional bar to fraternity discrimination?
Professor Horowitz, writing in 1952, concluded that there was, in
the case of fraternities on a state university campus.'0 8 Admit-
ting that discriminatory fraternities did not themselves act in
violation of the Constitution, and that in no case could a frater-
nity be forced to admit a particular member, nevertheless
"recognition" by a state university of a fraternity constituted
"state action," making the Fourteenth Amendment operative on
the fraternity's admission policies.
In 1959, the Attorney General of California, in a more
guarded opinion on this question, 10 9 said that specific answers
depended on the specific relation between a particular school
and its fraternities, and concluded that, since the types of re-
lations possible between fraternities and state universities were
almost unlimited in number, the most that could be said was
104 The exact nature of the school does not appear, other than from the
name and from the fact that plaintiff was only five years old. Under the
"state action" test, the type of school would be irrelevant; under a "bal-
ancing" test, it might be significant.
105 McKinney, 1948. This statute was applied as long ago as 1919. See Mc-
Kaine v. Drake Business School, Inc., 107 Misc. 241, 176 N. Y. Supp. 33
(App. T., 1st Dept. 1919).
106 McKinney, 1964 Supp.
107 4-B Ann. Laws of Mass., c. 151 C (1957); N. J. S. A. § 18: 25-5 1. (1963
Supp.). See Note, Fair Educational Practices Acts: A Solution to Discrimi-
nation, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 307 (1950).
108 Horowitz, Discriminatory Fraternities at State Universities-A Violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment? 25 So. Calif. L. Rev. 289 (1952).
109 32 Ops. Att'y. Gen. Calif. 264 (1959).
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that some relations were such that discrimination by a state
university fraternity would be unconstitutional, as well as con-
trary to public policy, whereas in other situations this would
not be the case. Inconclusive as this may sound, it is more per-
suasive than Professor Horowitz's rather dogmatic assertion that
"state action" may be found wherever "official recognition" is
given by the state university.
At the other extreme is the argument advanced in a recent
student note that none of the customary relationships between
a state university and a fraternity, taken singly or collectively,
is enough to constitute "state action." 110 This probably goes
too far.
If the result of the "state action" test is inconclusive, what
of a "balancing" test? From the point of view of the student
discriminated against, it makes no difference whether he is at-
tending a state or private institution. Nor is there any discernible
difference in the social patterns of the student body. The state's
involvement in the financing and operation of the state univer-
sity has very little bearing on the social relationships of the
students. Application of a balancing theory would therefore
tend to support the conclusion of the student editor just cited,
but for different reasons.
Pursuing the "balancing" theory further, it would seem that
this is a matter best left to local responsibility. As a practical
matter, local authorities are largely eliminating the problem
voluntarily. Just as many private universities have barred the
discriminatory fraternity, many state legislatures have taken
similar measures with respect to fraternities at state universities,
and at public schools in general. Sometimes this has gone to the
extreme of barring fraternities altogether (probably for reasons
not directly related to racial or religious discrimination), or at
least those affiliated with national organizations. Drastic though
such action seems, it has consistently withstood constitutional
attack.1 1' A fortiori, the lesser measure of outlawing discrimi-
110 Comment, State Universities and the Discriminatory Fraternity: A
Constitutional Analysis, 8 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 168 (1961).
111 Waugh v. Board of Trustees of the University of Mississippi, 237 U. S.
589 (1915); Webb v. State University of New York, 125 F. Supp. 910 (N. D.,
N. Y. 1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U. S. 867 (1954), noted, 30 N. D. Law. 472(1955); Hughes v. Caddo Parish School Board, 57 F. Supp. 508 (W. D., La.
1944) j. aff'd. 323 U. S. 685 (1945). See Gitlitz, The Power of a School
Board of Education to Ban or Regulate High School Fraternities and Soror-
ities, 9 N. Y. U. Intram. L. Rev. 97 (1954).
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nation at fraternities on a state university campus would be
within the authority of a state legislature.
1 12
Welfare Clubs
In Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan Police,113 defend-
ant, a private corporation, operated boys' clubs in the District of
Columbia on a segregated basis. It received extensive coopera-
tion from the District police in its drives for membership and
donations, it used the services of some ten uniformed policemen
in its club activities, and it had in the past used three abandoned
properties owned by the District. The Court held that defend-
ant was a private corporation and that the cooperation of the
District and the Metropolitan Police, on the facts, had not con-
verted it into an "instrument of government."
Of course, this is not quite the question. Under the tradi-
tional test, the question is whether "state action" is involved.
Certainly it was present here, in some measure. Surely the pub-
lic tends to identify boys' clubs sponsored by the police with
the police; in fact, the latter rely on this identification in their
appeals to donors and in their appeals to the boys themselves.
On the other hand, under a "balancing" test, the result may
have been justified. No subterfuge was involved. Defendant
was a private organization, dependent on voluntary contribu-
tions; police participation, although significant, was in no sense
a wielding of police authority. Plaintiffs were not denied the
benefits of membership in a boys' club; they were simply re-
quired to accept such membership, if at all, on a segregated
basis. However one may personally deplore the practice of racial
segregation, there is a real question whether it is the function of
the Fourteenth Amendment and of the federal courts to strike it
down whenever and wherever it rears its ugly head.
An opposite result was reached on somewhat similar facts,
in Statom v. Board of Commissioners of Prince George's
County.114 Here the court found that the use, without charge,
by a privately sponsored boys' club of county offices, and of
public school premises and playgrounds, was enough to consti-
tute "state action," requiring operation of the club on a de-
112 32 Ops. Att'y. Gen. Calif. 264, at 268 (1959); Comment, State Universi-
ties and the Discriminatory Fraternity: A Constitutional Analysis, 8 U. C.
L. A. L. Rev. 168, at 185-89 (1961).
11" 157 F. Supp. 101 (D. D. C. 1957).
114 233 Md. 57, 195 A. 2d 41 (1963).
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segregated basis. The Maryland court found the Mitchell case
difficult to reconcile with the decisions of the Supreme Court,
especially the intervening case of Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Authority.115 A recent news account states that a series of
lawsuits against 180 local segregated branches of the Y. M. C. A.
in the South is being started by the N. A. A. C. P.116 The first
suit was filed on February 20, 1965, in the federal court in
Charlotte, N. C., the second on February 25, in Norfolk, Va. Both
suits invoke the "public accommodation" sections of Title II of
the new Civil Rights Act. While the National Council of the
Y. M. C. A. favors desegregation, it allows considerable autonomy
to local branches. If the latter fight the lawsuits, it will un-
doubtedly be on the basis of the exemption afforded by the
statute to "private clubs." 117 The outcome will be awaited with
interest.
Political Clubs.
In 1890, the New York Court of Appeals held that the Demo-
cratic General Committee of Kings County, which was the con-
trolling body of the Kings County Democratic organization, was
merely a voluntary association of individuals, which could ex-
clude at will a delegate purportedly elected to represent a town
association which the Committee had ordered disbanded. 1 18 In
1953, the United States Supreme Court held that the "Jaybird
Democratic Association" of Fort Bend County, Texas, could not
exclude qualified Negro voters from membership. 119
What is the distinction between the two cases? The Jaybird
Association, although ostensibly a private organization not gov-
erned by state election laws and not using state elective ma-
chinery, was an integral part of the Democratic party machinery
of the State of Texas. For sixty years its candidates had in-
variably been nominated in the Democratic primaries and elected
to office. The Supreme Court had held that Negroes could not
constitutionally be denied the right to vote in State primary elec-
115 365 U. S. 715 (1961).
116 New York Times, February 26, 1965.
117 The National Council's attorneys interpret the Act as applicable to Y. M.
C. A. centers. A distinction may have to be drawn, however, between those
centers which provide living and dining quarters and those which do not.
Ibid.
118 McKane v. Adams, 123 N. Y. 609, 25 N. E. 1057 (1890).
119 Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953).
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tions.120 Neither could they be denied such right by the use of
a "club," or "voluntary association," the chief object of which
was to deny them any voice or participation in the election of
county officials. 121
Clearly, the device of a "voluntary" association or "private"
club may not be used to deprive citizens of the right to vote,
whether in general or primary elections, at the national, state, or
local level. But where does this leave the old-fashioned political
club, with its district leader and its "ward-heelers," or the State
or county party committee, with delegates from local party
groups? McKane v. Adams 1 22 has not been overruled but its
rationale, based on a privilege-right dichotomy and on the theory
that the membership policies of voluntary associations are in-
sulated from judicial control, is no longer valid. It is suggested
that, as a political club or committee moves toward control of
State or local elective machinery (and this can happen in Tam-
many Hall as well as in the Deep South), to that extent judicial
concern should increase. If the result is to exclude a citizen from
having an effective vote, the answer is clear. If it is less than
that, for example denial of the right to participate in formula-
tion of the party's platform, the answer is less obvious. Van
Allstyne and Karst would draw the line just at this point: So
long as no citizen is deprived of the right to have his vote count
as effectively as any other's, he cannot be heard to complain if
he is not admitted to the party's smoke-filled rooms and delibera-
tive counsels. 12 3 This makes sense as a pragmatic solution, but
only the future can tell whether the line will in fact be drawn
at this point. The provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957,124
1960,125 and 1964,12, would not seem to affect this conclusion.
120 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73
(1932).
121 This result was foreshadowed in Baskin v. Brown, 174 F. 2d 391 (4th
Cir. 1949), and in Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. 2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
333 U. S. 875 (1948).
122 Supra, n. 118.
123 Van Alstyne and Karst, State Action, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 3, at 25-27 (1961).
124 71 Stat. 634 (1957), 42 U. S. C. §§ 1975-1975e (1958). See Comment, 9
Cath. U. L. Rev. 85 (1960).
125 74 Stat. 90 (1960), 42 U. S. C. §§ 1971(c), 1971(e), 1971 (f) (Supp. V,
1964).
126 Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. See Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1960, 78
Harv. L. Rev. 684, at 685-87 (1965).
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Economic Organizations
(a) Labor Unions
In many industries and trades, denial of union membership
is tantamount to denial of employment, at least on the level
sought. Legal attack on discriminatory practices has taken three
general forms: reliance on the constitution; invoking of statutes
and regulations which affect the problem collaterally; and en-
actment of statutes which attack the problem directly. The first
approach has had only limited success, the second has shown
some modest victories, the third offers the best hope of a solution.
Constitutional Attack. In Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Firemen and Engineermen,127 a Negro locomotive-fire-
man, barred from admission to an all white union, claimed denial
of due process under the Fifth Amendment. In denying relief,
it was held that the railway brotherhood was not a state or fed-
eral agency, and that its certification as exclusive bargaining
agent under the Railway Labor Act did not make it such. The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin reached a similar result in Ross v.
Ebert,128 involving a masons' and bricklayers' union. Contrary
results have been reached by the courts of California 129 and
Kansas.13 0
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that, while
a union recognized by federal law as an exclusive bargaining
agent cannot be compelled to admit Negroes to membership, it
must represent fairly all the employees it serves in the process
of collective bargaining.' 3 ' It may be questioned whether this
is adequate,132 especially for a worker excluded from a union
which has a closed-shop or union-shop agreement. An abstract
right to be fairly represented is of little value if a worker cannot
get a job in the first place.
127 156 F. Supp. 89 (N. D. Ohio), cert. denied, 355 U. S. 893 (1957), aff'd.
262 F. 2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958) cert. denied, 359 U. S. 935 (1959). See Welling-
ton, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and "Government Action," 70
Yale L. J. 345 (1961); Note, Constitutional Right to Membership in a
Labor Union-Sth and 14th Amendments, 8 J. Pub. L. 580 (1959).
128 275 Wis. 523, 82 N. W. 2d 315 (1957) (6-1 decision).
129 Thompson v. Moore Drydock Co., 27 Cal. 2d 595, 165 P. 2d 901 (1946);
Williams v. International Brotherhood, 27 Cal. 2d 586, 165 P. 2d 903 (1946);
James v. Marineship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P. 2d 329 (1945).
130 Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P. 2d 831 (1946).
131 Steele v. Louisville & N. R. R., 323 U. S. 192 (1944). Cf. Syres v. Oil
Workers Int'l. Local 23, 350 U. S. 892, rev'g. 223 F. 2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955).
132 Wellington, op. cit. supra, n. 127, at 361.
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Collateral Attack. Since 1941, all federal Government con-
tracts (with minor exceptions) have been required to include a
clause whereby the contractor agrees not to discriminate against
any employee or applicant for employment because of race, reli-
gion, color, or national origin. 133 It has been observed that the
practice of "Jim Crow" unionism is bound to frustrate the pur-
pose of this program.134
In Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Committee, 35 plaintiffs had
been denied participation in defendant union's apprenticeship
program, and consequently from membership in the union. They
claimed that they were thus effectively excluded from employ-
ment on a Government construction contract. The District
Court granted mandatory injunctive relief, both on constitu-
tional grounds (the federal Government's participation in the
project constituting state action), but not on the ground that
plaintiffs were third-party beneficiaries of the non-discrimination
clause of the Government contract.1 36 Unfortunately for this
bold attempt at making new law, the court of appeals vacated
the judgment on the ground that completion of the Government
contract had rendered the matter moot. 137 The Supreme Court
has denied certiorari.38
In the Todd opinion, Judge Campbell rejected the argument
that jurisdiction of such a controversy had been pre-empted by
the National Labor Relations Act, holding that Section 8(b) (1)
of that Act,1 39 dealing with unfair labor practices, did not cover
133 The current requirement is found in Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed.
Reg. 1977 (1961), as amended. See generally Norgren, Government Con-
tracts and Fair Employment Practices, 29 Law and Con. Prob. 225 (1964);
Powers, Federal Procurement and Equal Employment Opportunity, 29 id.
468 (1964); Speck, Enforcement of Nondiscrimination Requirements for
Government Contract Work, 63 Col. L. Rev. 243 (1963).
134 Pasley, The Nondiscrimination Clause in Government Contracts, 43 Va.
L. Rev. 837, at 844-45 (1957). Cf., Birnbaum, Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity and Executive Order 10925, 11 Kan. L. Rev. 17, at 24-25 (1962).
135 223 F. Supp. 12 (N. D. Ill., 1963), j. vacated, 332 F. 2d 243 (7th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 33 U. S. L. W. 3284, 3286 (3/1/65), noted 50 Cornell L. Q.
75 (1964).
136 And in Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 329 F. 2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964),
aff'g. 215 F. Supp. 729 (E. D. Pa. 1963), it was held that the nondiscrimina-
tion clause conferred no third-party beneficiary rights on aggrieved appli-
cants for employment, at least until the latter had exhausted their ad-
ministrative remedies. See Pasley, op. cit. supra, note 134, at 855.
137 332 F. 2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964).
138 33 U. S. L. W. 3284, 3286 (1965).
139 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 158(b) (1) (1958).
May, 1965
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol14/iss2/3
EXCLUSION OR EXPULSION
the type of discriminatory practices here involved. Ironically,
this is just what the National Labor Relations Board did not
hold, when the question was actually presented to them. In the
case of Metal Workers Union (Hughes Tool Co.),140 the Board
held that a racially discriminatory admissions policy by a union
was an unfair labor practice within Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the
Act. Specifically, the unfair practice consisted in refusing to
process the grievance of a Negro employee who had been de-
nied an apprenticeship by the employer in a job reserved for
white employees under the collective bargaining agreement
negotiated by the union with the employer. This result was
anticipated by a prior ruling of the Board' 4 1 that a union's failure
to fulfil its obligation of fair representation under the Steele
case' 4 2 was an unfair labor practice. In that case, however, the
court of appeals had denied enforcement. 143
The practical result of a finding of an unfair labor practice
is to deny or rescind certification of the union, a potent weapon
in the industrial relations area. The Board has not been unani-
mous in its approach, however. Chairman McCulloch and Mem-
ber Fanning do not believe that Congress intended to make a
union's violation of its duty of fair representation an unfair labor
practice. While they concurred, in part, in the Hughes Tool Case,
it was on the ground that the union had refused to process a
grievance for an employee who was a non-union member, not be-
cause racial discrimination was involved. Their dissenting views
find support in two recent law review notes.144
Direct Statutory Attack. In some states, the civil rights stat-
utes expressly prohibit racial or religious discrimination by labor
unions.145 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964146 attacks the
140 146 N. L. R. B. No. 166, 56 L. R. R. M. 1289 (July 1, 1964).
141 Miranda Fuel Co., Inc., 140 N. L. R. B. 181 (1962).
142 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 323 U. S. 192 (1944).
143 N. L. R. B. v. Miranda Fuel Co., Inc., 326 F. 2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963) (2-1
decision). The rationale of the Hughes Tool case, supra, n. 40 and Miranda
Coal case, supra, n. 141, has been followed by the Board in Local 1367, Intl.
Longshoremen's Assn. (Galveston Maritime Assn., Inc.), 148 N. L. R. B. No.
44, 57 L. R. R. M. 1083 (Sept. 11, 1964) and in Local No. 12, United Rubber,
Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 150 N. L. R. B. No. 18, 4 CCH Labor
Law Rep. 13,655 (Dec. 16, 1964).
144 50 Va. L. Rev. 1221 (1964); 78 Harv. L. Rev. 679 (1965). But see Com-
ment, Racial Discrimination and the Duty of Fair Representation, 65 Col. L.
Rev. 273 (1965).
145 E.g., § 43 of the New York Civil Rights Law prohibits a labor organiza-
tion, by practice, constitution, by-law, tacit agreement, or otherwise, from
(Continued on next page)
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problem squarely by prohibiting discrimination in employment
opportunity on the ground of race, color, religion, national origin,
or sex. (Some exceptions are permitted as to the last three,
where these are bona fide occupational qualifications.) Labor
unions are covered if (1) they maintain a hiring hall, or (2)
they have 25 or more employees and are (a) certified under
the National Labor Relations Act or the Railway Labor Act,
(b) recognized by an employer covered by Title VII, or (c) re-
lated in certain ways to a labor organization which is covered.
Title VII does not go fully into effect until July 2, 1965.147
It has been suggested that the Civil Rights Act should be
construed to preclude NLRB expansion into the area which it
covers, although the general counsel for the NAACP has urged
resort to the NLRB procedures as speedier than those afforded
by the Act.14s
In the case of a union member claiming wrongful expulsion
for exercising a constitutional or political right, a leading case
is Mitchell v. International Association of Machinists.149 Peti-
tioners were expelled from their union for campaigning in sup-
port of a "right-to-work law, in contravention of the official
policy of the union. The court ordered them reinstated, on the
ground that the citizen's right to engage in personal political
activity is so important that the union will not be allowed to use
its power over its individual members to curb advocacy of their
(Continued from preceding page)
denying membership by reason of race, creed, color, or national origin, or
to deny equal treatment to any of its members for such reasons. The
constitutionality of this statute has been upheld by the New York Court of
Appeals and the United States Supreme Court in Railway Mail Ass'n. v.
Corsi, 293 N. Y. 315, 56 N. E. 2d 721 (1944), afl'd. 326 U. S. 88 (1945). An
interesting recent case involving this statute, and others, is Gaynor v. Rocke-
feller, 21 App. Div. 2d 92, 248 N. Y. S. 2d 792 (1st Dept. 1964). In a situation
not unlike that of the Todd case, supra, n. 135, the New York courts denied
relief, for a variety of reasons. See discussion by Hanslowe, Annual Survey
of New York Law-Labor Relations Law, 16 Syracuse L. Rev. 244-46 (1964).
146 Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253.
147 See The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 684, at 588-90 (1965).
148 Recent Case Note, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 679, at 682-83 (1965).
149 196 C. A. 2d 796, 16 Calif. Rep. 813 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961), pet. for
hearing by Supreme Court denied, Jan. 9, 1962, 196 id. 808. This decision
reversed the ruling of the lower court, 39 C. C. H. Labor Cases 1 66321
(1960), noted in 74 Harv. L. Rev. 624 (1961). See, generally Summers,
Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1068 (1951).
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political views, at least where the latter are not patently in con-
flict with the union's best interests.
1 50
The rule of the Mitchell case is now embodied in the so-
called "Bill of Rights" for union members, sections 101 and fol-
lowing of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959.151 These sections provide, inter alia, that union members
may assemble freely with other members and express "any
views, arguments, or opinion," subject, however to the union's
right to enforce "reasonable rules as to the responsibility of
every member toward the organization as an institution and to
his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its per-
formance of its legal or contractual obligations." They also pro-
tect the right of union members to sue the union or its of-
ficers, to appear as witnesses, and to petition the legislature,
the right to sue being subject to a requirement of reasonable ex-
haustion of internal union remedies. 15 2 These provisions have
been broadly construed by the courts and the National Labor
150 Although there has been some tendency by the courts to hold that all
such disciplinary action by private groups is beyond judicial supervision,
there is respectable authority for the proposition that the courts will inter-
fere if there has been denial of due process. In this context, this is taken
to mean that (i) the rules invoked and the proceedings followed must be
in accordance with natural justice, (ii) the expulsion must be in accordance
with the rules, and (iii) the proceedings must be free from malice or bad
faith. Requirement (i) is usually taken to call for notice of the charges and
an opportunity to defend at a fair hearing before an impartial group. See
Seavey, Dismissal of Students: Due Process, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1406 (1960);
University of Ceylon v. Fernando [1960], 1 A. E. R. 631 [1960], 1 W. L. R.
223 (P. C.), noted in 23 Mod. L. Rev. 428 (1960); Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education, 294 F. 2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'g. 186 F. Supp. 945
(M. D., Ala. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U. S. 930 (1961), noted, 75 Harv. L. Rev.
1429 (1962), 60 Mich. L. Rev. 499 (1962), 50 Geo. L. J. 314 (1961), 38 N. D. L.
Rev. 346 (1962), 35 Temple L. Q. 437 (1962), 15 Vand. L. Rev. 1005 (1962);
Knight v. State Board of Education, 200 F. Supp. 174 (M. D. Tenn. 1961).
Cf., Woods v. Wright, 334 F. 2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964).
If these requirements are met, the courts will not normally question the
decision of the association or consider the facts or seriousness of the alleged
offense. See Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 63
Harv. L. Rev. 993, at 1014-20 (1930) and cases cited at 1016-18. See Com-
ment, Administrative Law: Right to Hearing Before Expulsion from Private
Club, 8 U. Fla. L. Rev. 125 (1955). See also Annotations, 20 A. L. R. 2d 344,
at 364-65 (1951), 14 A. L. R. 1446 (1921).
In situations where it is alleged that in expelling or otherwise disciplin-
ing a member, the association is punishing him for exercising a basic consti-
tutional right, these have caused some concern to the courts. See Steier v.
New York State Education Commission, 271 F. 2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U. S. 966 (1960), noted 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1388 (1960).
151 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U. S. C. §§ 411-415 (Supp. V, 1964).
152 See Note, Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations, 1959-1964,
40 N. D. Law. 86 (1964); Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and
(Continued on next page)
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Relations Board so as to protect basic civil and political rights.153
Thus, union members have been protected from disciplinary
action for failing to exhaust their internal union remedies before
bringing proceedings charging the union with unfair labor prac-
tices.15 4 On the other hand, where union members have filed
a petition to decertify the union and have actively supported the
decertification cause, the Board has held that they are attack-
ing the very existence of the union, and that their expulsion is
justified. 15 5
(b) Professional Associations
In principle, the right to join a professional association
should present the same considerations as the right to join a
labor union. But only gradually has it been realized that denial
of such right may be tantamount to denial of, or serious inter-
ference with, a means of livelihood and therefore cannot be
effected arbitrarily. It has recently been claimed that there is "a
constitutional right to join an association which exists to facili-
tate access of its members to a livelihood." 156 This, however,
may be overstating the case.
Certainly, the older view was that a professional association
was a mere private organization, which could set its own stand-
ards of admission, with which the courts would not interfere in
the absence of obvious abuse. The question arose frequently in
connection with medical associations which excluded doctors
who had not met certain prescribed standards of education, or
(Continued from preceding page)
Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 851, at 862-72 (1960); Sherman, The
Individual Member and the Union: The Bill of Rights Title in the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 54 N. W. U. L. Rev. 803,
at 817-20 (1960). In general, see Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases
of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Re-
lationship, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1435 (1963).
153 See, e.g., Farowitz v. Associated Musicians, 330 F. 2d 999 (2d Cir. 1964);
Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F. 2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963) cert. denied, 357 U. S.
946 (1963). See also the comprehensive opinion of Judge Larson in Nelson
v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233 (D. Minn. 1963), aff'd. 325 F. 2d 646 (8th Cir.
1963).
154 Local 38, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, and
Charles S. Skura, 148 NLRB No. 74, 57 LRRM 1009 (1964).
155 Tawas Tube Products, Inc., Harold Lohr, and United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO, 151 NLRB No. 9, 57 LRRM 1330 (1965).
156 Rice, Freedom of Association, 99 (1962).
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who practiced unorthodox techniques such as osteopathy.
Traditionally, the courts refused to interfere in such cases.15 7
A recent important case casts doubt on the continued va-
lidity of such an absolute rule. In Falcone v. Middlesex County
Medical Society,l 5s the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that
it was arbitrary and unreasonable for defendant to exclude from
membership, by invoking an unwritten rule requiring four years'
attendance at an approved medical college, an osteopath who had
an M.D. degree from an approved medical school, who had re-
ceived an unrestricted license from the state to practice medicine
and surgery, who was regarded by his colleagues as qualified,
and who was not charged with any unethical conduct.
A related question is whether a private hospital may ex-
clude Negro doctors from practice, or admit them only on a dis-
criminatory basis. 15
In an attempt by members of a bar association to delete a
discriminatory membership provision from its by-laws, the presi-
dent at the meeting declared the motion carried by a voice vote.
In a suit brought by some of the dissenters, 10 it was ruled that
the president had violated the by-laws and Robert's Rules of
Order by failing to call for a rising vote. In so holding, however,
the Court made the following interesting observation:
157 Hayman v. City of Galveston, 273 U. S. 414 (1927) (Municipal hospital
board excluded osteopaths from practice in hospital; held, not a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Harris v. Thomas, 217 S. W. 2d 1068 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1920) (Osteopath excluded from practice in private hospital).
158 34 N. J. 582, 170 A. 2d 791 (1961). See Annotation, 89 A. L. R. 2d 964
(1963); Neuhoff, Private Not-for-Profit Organizations, 9 Prac. Law. (7) 55,
at 63 (Nov. 1963). Cf., England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Ex-
aminers, 259 F. 2d 626 (5th Cir. 1958), petition for rehearing denied, 263 F.
2d 661 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U. S. 1012 (1959), noted 47 Calif. L. Rev.
925 (1959).
159 See Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F. 2d 959 (4th
Cir. 1963) (3-2 decision), rev'g. 211 F. Supp. 628 (M. D., N. C. 1962), cert.
denied, 376 U. S. 938 (1964), noted 66 W. Va. L. Rev. 325 (1964). See Com-
ment, Working Rules for Assuring Nondiscrimination in Hospital Adminis-
tration, 74 Yale L. J. 137 (1964). Participation by two private hospitals
(defendants) in the Hill-Burton joint federal and state program, 60 Stat.
1041 (1946), as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 291-291n (1958), as amended, 42
U. S. C. §§ 291g, 291i, 291k, 291n, 291n-1 (Supp. V, 1964). Held: allocation
of aid to hospital facilities constituted "state action." Cf., Eaton v. Board of
Managers of James Walker Memorial Hospital, supra, n. 39, cited by dis-
sent 323 F. 2d at 971. See also Zlotowitz v. Jewish Hospital, 193 Misc. 124,
84 N. Y. Supp. 61 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co. 1948), aff'd. 277 App. Div. 2d 974, 100
N. Y. S. 2d 226 (1st Dept. 1950).
160 Goshorn v. Bar Association of the District of Columbia, 152 F. Supp. 300
(D. C., D. C. 1957).
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It is apparent to any person of fair mind that, if the
defendant Association wishes to represent and to speak for
all the lawyers of the District, then in all fairness it ought
to make all lawyers eligible for membership. If it does not
do so, then members of the bar who champion the proposed
amendment ought to unite with other members of like mind
and organize an all-inclusive bar association for the District
which would be authorized to speak and act for all persons
admitted to practice before the United States District Court.
The defendant Association, for a long time, has re-
stricted its membership, and some of its members emphasize
that object and purpose of the Association which is "to
increase the mutual improvement and social intercourse of
its members." If they feel that the social purposes of a
limited membership are of more importance than being the
agency of the entire bar of the District, their wishes and
desires should not be overridden or denied except by ac-
tion of the Association taken in accordance with the By-
Laws.161
Conclusion
Groucho Marx once said that he would not join a club that
would stoop so low as to have him as a member. Behind the
mordant witticism lies a profound truth, that in the area of per-
sonal choice and voluntary association there is bound to be
much that is arbitrary, capricious, and even irrational. Law is
the enemy of the arbitrary, the capricious, and the irrational.
It is understandable then that crusaders for constitutional rights
should so often be impatient of the unfairness done, the injustice
wreaked, and the emotional harm visited on their fellows by
discriminatory individuals and groups. But law is also the em-
bodiment of freedom. Freedom is the hallmark of personal choice
and voluntary association, and these lead us back, in many in-
stances, to the arbitrary, the capricious, the irrational.
10 2
The two competing claims are irreconcilable. Either one,
pushed to its ultimate, will necessarily oust the other. The law
has had to strike a balance, somehow to steer a course between
Scylla and Charybdis, somehow to give each its due, and thereby
to arrive at that most elusive of man's goals, Justice. It has been
the purpose of this paper to show how this has been attempted
in the area of voluntary associations. On the whole, the solu-
161 Id. at 306.
162 See Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 Tex. L. Rev. 347, at 380-
81, 390 (1963).
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tions arrived at seem pragmatic and sensible; none is final, none
can be. No grand formula has been found; none has been sought.
Rather, the process throughout is, and must be, one of balancing
the sincere demand for equality of treatment against the no less
genuine claim for freedom of choice. Beyond this, the answer
lies in the realm of conscience and morality, not with law and
the state.
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